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Charter Values and Administrative
Justice
Lorne Sossin* and Mark Friedman**

I. INTRODUCING THE PUZZLE OF CHARTER VALUES AND
ADMINISTRATIVE JUSTICE
What would the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms1 have
looked like if it had been designed for administrative justice? This is a
question underlying our analysis in this study. Ever since the Supreme
Court made clear in Slaight Communications Inc. v. Davidson that
discretionary decisions of public officials were to be subject to the
Charter,2 and expanded the reach of the Charter to most adjudicative
tribunals,3 the Court has wrestled with the coherence of the relationship
between the Charter and administrative justice. The Court attempted to
chart a new path forward beyond a traditional application of the Charter
to incorporate a potentially broader but inchoate set of “Charter values”
in its 2012 decision Doré.4 With this decision as a point of departure, we
elaborate below on the scope of Charter values and their distinct
implication for administrative justice.
*

Dean and Professor, Osgoode Hall Law School. Material drawn from this paper was presented
at the Osgoode Hall Law School Conference on Administrative Law and Practice, October 23, 2013,
and at the CLE B.C. Administrative Law Conference in Vancouver on October 29, 2013, and we are
grateful to the participants at those conferences for their comments and suggestions. We are also
indebted to a number of colleagues who read and offered their thoughts on earlier drafts, including
Benjamin Berger, Chris Bredt, Jamie Cameron, Peter Hogg, Allan Hutchinson, Grant Huscroft,
Nicolas Lambert, Sheila Wildeman and David Wright.
**
JD Candidate 2015.
1
Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (U.K.),
1982, c. 11 [hereinafter “Charter”].
2
[1989] S.C.J. No. 45, [1989] 1 S.C.R. 1038 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Slaight
Communications”]. See June M. Ross, “Applying the Charter to Discretionary Authority” (1991) 29
Alta. L. Rev. 382 [hereinafter “Ross”] (on the significance of Slaight Communications).
3
See Nova Scotia v. Laseur, [2003] S.C.J. No. 54, [2003] 2 S.C.R. 504 (S.C.C.). Paul v.
British Columbia (Forest Appeals Commission), [2003] S.C.J. No. 34, [2003] 2 S.C.R. 585 (S.C.C.).
and more recently R. v. Conway, [2010] S.C.J. No. 22, 2010 SCC 22 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Conway”].
4
Doré v. Barreau du Québec, [2012] S.C.J. No. 12, 2012 SCC 12 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Doré”].
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Administrative justice is defined by its diversity. While courts in
every part of the country look roughly similar (all have a dais for the
judge, a jury box, a chair for witnesses, counsel tables, a gallery for
spectators, etc.), few people can close their eyes and picture what a
landlord tenant board, immigration and refugee board or social benefits
tribunal looks like. Yet that is where a vulnerable tenant goes to stave off
eviction, where a refugee claimant goes to avoid deportation, and where
a person whose benefits have been curtailed goes for recourse. In other
words, vitally important disputes, involving fundamental rights and
freedoms, are the province of widely disparate adjudicative bodies. There
are literally hundreds of tribunals, at the federal, provincial and
municipal levels, involving thousands of full- and part-time adjudicators
applying a myriad of statutory schemes and regulatory regimes. If the
Charter is to be Canada’s “supreme law”, it must have relevance for
those who are most vulnerable to the adverse effects of government
action (and inaction). If the Charter is to matter, it must matter in the
realm of administrative justice.
Justice McLachlin (as she then was) seemed to anticipate this state of
affairs more than a decade ago in her oft-quoted dissent in Cooper v.
Canada (Canadian Human Rights Commission),5 a case which probed
the extent to which tribunals had jurisdiction to consider the
constitutionality of their enabling legislation. The majority in Cooper
held that a human rights commission lacked the authority to decide
Charter questions because its purpose and structure were not aligned with
the adjudication of Charter rights. Justice McLachlin’s dissent not only
reached the opposite conclusion, but did so expressly on the grounds that
the Charter should be relevant where people’s rights were determined.
It included the following memorable reference:
The Charter is not some holy grail which only judicial initiates of the
superior courts may touch. The Charter belongs to the people. All law
and law-makers that touch the people must conform to it. Tribunals and
commissions charged with deciding legal issues are no exception.
Many more citizens have their rights determined by these tribunals than
by the courts. If the Charter is to be meaningful to ordinary people, then
it must find its expression in the decisions of these tribunals. 6

5
6

[1996] S.C.J. No. 115, [1996] 3 S.C.R 854 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Cooper”].
Id., at para. 70.
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This passage was later adopted by a majority in Nova Scotia (Workers’
Compensation Board) v. Martin,7 where the Court reversed Cooper and
confirmed that tribunals that have the power to decide any question of law
will presumptively have the power to hear and adjudicate the Charter.
In Conway,8 the Supreme Court extended administrative jurisdiction
even further by establishing that tribunals that are competent to decide
questions of law also have jurisdiction not only to consider Charter
issues, but also to grant Charter remedies to the extent that those
remedies are consistent with their enabling legislation. Tribunals can
therefore be understood as adjudicative spaces that enjoy both full access
to the Charter and a broad capacity for public engagement.
In this line of case law, the Supreme Court of Canada recognized that
parties could seek Charter remedies from tribunals notwithstanding the
practical challenges of doing so. The Court’s reticence to engage with the
uneven capacity of administrative tribunals is understandable, if
problematic. After all, the capacity of a tribunal or administrative
decision-maker is not driven by a legislative enactment, but rather by
executive action, and can vary depending on the staffing, appointments
and resources of a particular tribunal at a particular time. That said, the
capacities of a tribunal are central to the effectiveness of the Charter.
As Abella J. observed in Tranchemontagne v. Ontario (Director,
Disability Support Program)9 (a case raising similar issues to Cooper and
Martin but in the context of the jurisdiction over the Human Rights
Code), ensuring access to a meaningful forum for having one’s rights
adjudicated is a key aspect of access to justice. With respect to the Social
Benefits Tribunal, she observed (in dissent):
The [Social Benefits Tribunal] is meant to be an efficient, effective, and
quick process. Yet it seems to be having difficulty meeting this
mandate. In 2004-2005, the SBT Tribunal had a backlog of 9,042 cases
and received 11,127 new appeals under the [Ontario Works Act] and
the ODSPA. This Court recognized in Tétreault-Gadoury … that
administrative bodies responsible for ensuring the payment of monetary
benefits to eligible applicants would undoubtedly be impeded from this
important and time-sensitive undertaking if they were asked to decide
constitutional challenges.

7
8
9

[2003] S.C.J. No. 54, [2003] 2 S.C.R. 504 (S.C.C.).
Supra, note 3.
[2006] S.C.J. No. 14, [2006] 1 S.C.R. 513 (S.C.C.).
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Imposing Code compliance hearings on the Tribunal will similarly and
inevitably impact its ability to assist the disabled community it was
established to benefit in a timely way. It will be difficult to explain to
the thousands of disabled individuals waiting for their appeals to be
heard — many without any interim support — that there is any public
benefit in the Tribunal hearing a complex, lengthy, and inevitably
delaying jurisprudential issue with no precedential value. That is the
real access issue in this case.10

A similar argument, of course, could be brought to bear on the
tribunal jurisdiction to apply formal Charter rights. Practical challenges
may render the Charter illusory in the context of administrative justice.
For example, is it likely that a self-represented party before the Social
Benefits Tribunal will properly identify a Charter issue, or have the
capacity to fashion submissions based on the current jurisprudence
related to a particular Charter right? How realistic is it to imagine such a
party responding to the Crown’s section 1 evidence? Will both legally
and non-legally trained adjudicators have the capacity to manage Charter
evidence? While some tribunals clearly can and are providing an
appropriate forum for Charter adjudication, others seem ill-suited to the
kind of Charter process designed by and for the courts in Canada.
In our view, what is needed to realize the promise of the Charter in
the context of administrative justice is a Charter practice that is designed
by and for administrative justice. Such a sphere of practice will need to
be far more pliable and adaptable than the context of the courts.
Administrative decision-makers vary with respect to procedure as well as
substantive and policy expertise — some are as adversarial as courts
while others adopt a more activist approach to adjudication. Some
involve inquisitorial processes which place the decision-maker in the
position of eliciting the necessary information from the parties. Others
still are discretionary or regulatory rather than adjudicative settings.
Hearings may occur electronically, over the phone, in person, or in
writing. Appearances before the Human Rights Tribunal may stretch into
weeks of complex evidentiary testimony, while some hearings before the
Landlord Tenant Board take less than 30 minutes. It is important that all
these diverse contexts where Charter hearings may unfold have rules
designed for a particular decision-maker’s context. Many tribunals across

10

Id., at paras. 90-91.
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Canada already have established Rules of Practice that guide applicants
in raising constitutional matters.
The Alberta Appeals Commission for Workers’ Compensation Board,
for instance, establishes a determined time frame and method for raising
constitutional claims:
3.3(1) A party who intends to raise a question of constitutional law
before the Appeals Commission relating to the distribution of powers
must first provide written notice of their intention to do so, at least
14 days before the scheduled hearing date, to
(a) the Attorney General of Canada,
(b) the Minister of Justice of Alberta and the Attorney General of
Alberta,
(c) the Appeals Commission, and
(d) every party.
(2) If the notice is not provided, the Appeals Commission must not
consider the constitutional question.

As Freya Kristjanson has emphasized, tribunals need to consider
more than just adapting their rules to the requirements and realities of
Charter litigation (including, for example, the requirement to provide
Notice of Constitutional Question to the Government):
Tribunals must consider the impact that the newly expanded Charter
jurisdiction has on all aspects of tribunal design. Clear procedural rules,
as discussed above, are merely the first step. Adjudicator education,
and adaptation of existing rules to what may be significantly more
complex types of Charter litigation, will be a challenge both in terms of
competence and funding. Finally, these cases may be the harbinger of a
new and exciting era in administrative law, fulfilling the Chief Justice’s
vision of a Charter that belongs to the people, applied with full force in
11
the administrative justice system.

While the development of distinctive Charter rules of practice for
administrative justice is in some sense a welcome response to the
concern over capacity and the logistics of tribunal hearings involving
the Charter, occasions where a Charter issue is identified and argued by

11
See Freya Kristjanson & N. Lambek, “The Charter in Context: Applying the Charter in
Everyday Administrative Decision-Making”, Paper presented for 11th Annual Charter Conference,
Ontario Bar Association, November 2012, at 28.
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the parties will be rare in most tribunal settings. Charter values, as
elaborated by the Supreme Court in Doré, by contrast, represent a
broader and far more accessible way to ensure the Charter’s relevance to
the sphere of administrative justice.
While the promise of Charter values under the Doré framework is
apparent, its potential application gives rise to a host of important
questions.12 First, how does the Charter itself fit within Administrative
Law? Second, what are the sources of Charter values, and are the
categories of Charter values set or growing? Third, what is the scope of
Charter values (for example, must a Charter value be tied to a Charter
right or a specific section or sections of the Charter)? Fourth and
finally, how can Charter values be operationalized within the
administrative justice context in a way that is coherent, transparent,
predictable and fair? This study is divided into three sections analyzing
and addressing each of these questions and their implications for
administrative justice.

II. RECONCILING ADMINISTRATIVE LAW AND THE CHARTER
Since the early days of Charter jurisprudence, the Supreme Court has
wrestled with how to reconcile Charter and administrative law principles,
particularly in the context of reviewing the exercise of administrative
discretion.13 The Charter may justify intervention in administrative
decisions in several different circumstances involving different degrees of
discretion.14
First, a law granting discretion may be unconstitutional by its very
terms. For example, a law authorizing a tribunal to grant a benefit to a

12
For a discussion of the challenges to which Charter values as set out in Doré give rise,
see Evan-Fox Decent & Alexander Pless, “The Charter and Administrative Law: Cross-Fertilization
or Inconstancy?” in L.M. Sossin & C.M. Flood, eds. Administrative Law in Context, 2d ed. (Toronto:
Emond Montgomery, 2012).
13
See especially Slaight Communications, supra, note 2; Ross v. New Brunswick School
District No. 15, [1996] S.C.J. No. 40, [1996] 1 S.C.R. 825 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Ross”]. Portions of
this analysis are drawn from L. Sossin, “Discretion Unbound: Reconciling the Charter and Soft
Law” (2003) 45 Can. Public Administration 465. Portions of the analysis to follow are drawn from
S. Gratton & L. Sossin, “In Search of Coherence: The Charter and Administrative Law under the
McLachlin Court” in D. Wright & A. Dodek, eds., Public Law at the McLachlin Court: The First
Decade (Toronto: Irwin Law, 2011).
14
In most cases, the grounds for a Charter challenge in administrative discretion cases are
based on violation of s. 2, 7 or 15, but the unconstitutional exercise of discretion might also be
located elsewhere under the Charter.

(2014), 67 S.C.L.R. (2d)

CHARTER VALUES AND ADMINISTRATIVE JUSTICE

397

defined group creates a discretion which, by its very terms, might violate
section 15 of the Charter if it necessarily excludes another group from
the benefit based on race, religion or one of the other enumerated or
analogous grounds. For example, in M. v. H., a provision of Ontario’s
Family Law Act was held to be discriminatory since it granted courts the
discretion to award spousal support only to heterosexual spouses and not
to same-sex couples.15
The second circumstance involves a law that grants discretion to a
tribunal that is not unconstitutional on its face, but such that it might
nevertheless be applied in an unconstitutional manner. For example, in
Eldridge v. British Columbia (Attorney General), a law authorizing the
Medical Services Commission to fund certain health services was found
not to violate the Charter, but the exercise of discretion by that
Commission in deciding not to fund interpreters for deaf patients was
found to be unconstitutional.16 Similarly, in Canada (Attorney General)
v. PHS Community Services Society,17 a federal Minister’s discretion not
to provide a statutory exemption to a safe injection site that provided
vital health benefits to its clients was held to violate the Charter. The
Court held that “[t]he discretion vested in the Minister of Health is not
absolute: as with all exercises of discretion, the Minister’s decisions must
conform to the Charter...”.18
In the third circumstance, a law granting wide discretionary authority
without sufficient guidance as to its application or without safeguards
against arbitrary conduct might violate the procedural component of
section 7 of the Charter. This basis for challenging discretion was relied
upon by the majority of the Supreme Court in R. v. Morgentaler.19 In
Morgentaler, the impugned provision was a law prohibiting abortion
unless a physician determined that the life or health of a woman was
endangered. The procedures that therapeutic abortion committees
established in hospitals to decide whether this threshold was met in
individual cases were found by the majority to lack coherence,
predictability and fairness.
Fourth, a law granting a discretion that is too vague to provide
sufficient notice to those who might infringe it may violate the

15
16
17
18
19

[1999] S.C.J. No. 23, [1999] 2 S.C.R. 3 (S.C.C.). Family Law Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. F.3.
[1997] S.C.J. No. 86, [1997] 3 S.C.R. 624 (S.C.C.).
[2011] S.C.J. No. 44, 2011 SCC 44 (S.C.C.).
Id., at para. 117.
[1988] S.C.J. No. 1, [1988] 1 S.C.R. 30 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Morgentaler”].
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substantive component of section 7.20 For example, in R. v. Morales, the
Court held that a provision granting pre-trial detention where it was
justified in “the public interest” was unconstitutionally vague.21
The Supreme Court’s first detailed examination of the relationship
between the Charter and administrative discretion was in Slaight
Communications.22 At issue in that case was a remedial discretion
in the Canada Labour Code that allowed adjudicators to resolve
grievances under collective agreements. 23 The grievance in Slaight
Communications concerned an allegation of wrongful dismissal. The
adjudicator found that the dismissal had been wrongful and ordered
the company, first, to provide the employee with a factual reference
and, second, to refrain from expressing any other views about the
employee. Chief Justice Dickson for the majority chose to conduct a
Charter analysis and held that neither aspect of the adjudicator’s order
violated the Charter. Justice Lamer (as he then was) dissented in part
and would have resolved the dispute on administrative law grounds.
However, Lamer J. wrote for the Court on the issue of the proper
approach to discretionary decision-making under the Charter. He
identified two kinds of discretion, each of which led to different
remedies:
1.

The exercise of discretion was made pursuant to legislation which
confers, either expressly or by necessary implication, the power to
infringe a protected [Charter] right.

— It is then necessary to subject the legislation to the test set out in s. 1
by ascertaining whether it constitutes a reasonable limit that can be
demonstrably justified in a free and democratic society.
2.

The legislation pursuant to which the administrative tribunal made
the disputed order confers an imprecise discretion and does not

20
See generally R. v. Nova Scotia Pharmaceutical Society, [1992] S.C.J. No. 67, [1992]
2 S.C.R. 606 (S.C.C.).
21
[1992] S.C.J. No. 98, [1992] 3 S.C.R. 711 (S.C.C.).
22
Supra, note 2. See Ross, supra, note 2.
23
R.S.C. 1970, c. L-1, as amended by S.C. 1977-78, c. 27, ss. 21, 61.5(9):
Where an adjudicator decides pursuant to subsection (8) that a person has been unjustly
dismissed, he may, by order, require the employer who dismissed him to (a) pay the
person compensation not exceeding the amount of money that is equivalent to
the remuneration that would, but for the dismissal, have been paid by the employer to the
person; (b) reinstate the person in his employ; and (c) do any other like thing that it is
equitable to require the employer to do in order to remedy or counteract any consequence
of the dismissal.
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confer, either expressly or by necessary implication, the power to
limit the rights guaranteed by the Charter.
— It is then necessary to subject the order made to the test set out in s.
1 by ascertaining whether it constitutes a reasonable limit that can
be demonstrably justified in a free and democratic society. …24

In the circumstances of Slaight Communications, the Court found
that the Labour Code did not require expressly or by necessary
implication that a Charter right be infringed, since the arbitrator could
have remedied the wrongful dismissal through other means; therefore,
the Labour Code created an imprecise discretion that permitted a Charter
right to be limited. Thus, it was the order, and not the legislation, that
was subjected to Charter scrutiny.25
The central holding of Slaight Communications was that no public
official could be authorized by a statute to breach the Charter and
therefore, all discretionary authority had to be read down to only
authorize decision-making which is consistent with Charter rights and
guarantees. Justice Lamer explained this reasoning in the following
terms:
Although this court must not add anything to legislation or delete
anything from it in order to make it consistent with the Charter, there is
no doubt in my mind that it should also not interpret legislation that is
open to more than one interpretation so as to make it inconsistent with
the Charter and hence of no force or effect. Legislation conferring an
imprecise discretion must therefore be interpreted as not allowing the
Charter rights to be infringed. Accordingly, an adjudicator exercising
delegated powers does not have the power to make an order that would
result in an infringement of the Charter and he exceeds his jurisdiction
26
if he does so.

Thus, discretionary authority always comes with an implied
condition, which is that it be exercised in a manner consistent with all
applicable Charter rights.

24

Slaight Communications, supra, note 2, at para. 91.
The majority found that, while both the positive and the negative order violated the
freedom of expression under s. 2(b) of the Charter, each was a reasonable limit under s. 1 and
therefore the orders were upheld.
26
Id., at para. 87.
25

400

SUPREME COURT LAW REVIEW

(2014), 67 S.C.L.R. (2d)

The principle in Slaight Communications was applied in subsequent
cases27 where the Court highlighted the overlapping nature of the Charter
and administrative law analysis, observing that it was difficult to
conceive of a case where a court would conclude that a decision was
unconstitutional but nonetheless reasonable.
The Court confronted the dilemma of administrative discretion again
in the context of Little Sisters Books and Art Emporium v. Canada
(Minister of Justice).28 At issue was the discretionary authority of
customs officials to seize imported goods that met the obscenity test
under section 163 of the Criminal Code.29 Justice Binnie, writing for the
majority, characterized the administration of the Customs Act30 by
customs officers as oppressive and dismissive of the appellants’ freedom
of expression. He concluded that the effect — whether intended or not —
was to isolate and disparage the appellants on the basis of their sexual
orientation.
The Court also held that, although the exercise of discretion by
customs officers violated the Charter, the Customs Act provision
authorizing this conduct did not. Following the Slaight Communications
approach, the majority of the Court characterized the discretion
contained in the customs legislation as capable of being applied in a
fashion consistent with the Charter. Therefore, the majority saw no basis
to strike down the authority of customs officials to seize material on the
grounds of obscenity.31
Sometimes, the Court may apply a Charter and administrative law
analysis to the same exercise of discretion. Suresh v. Canada (Minister of
Citizenship and Immigration),32 for example, dealt with the discretionary
authority of the Minister to deport refugees in circumstances where they

27

See Ross, supra, note 13, and Eaton v. Brant County Board of Education, [1996] S.C.J.
No. 98, [1997] 1 S.C.R. 241 (S.C.C.).
28
[2000] S.C.J. No. 66, [2000] 2 S.C.R. 1120 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Little Sisters”].
29
R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46.
30
R.S.C. 1985, c. 1 (2nd Supp.).
31
See Little Sisters, supra, note 28, at para. 204. Justice Iacobucci, writing for himself and
two other members of the Court, dissented on this point. He held that the legislation itself was
unconstitutional since it did not contain sufficient safeguards against unconstitutional enforcement.
For the minority, simply trusting the customs bureaucracy to improve its administration of the Act
was not enough, and they would have imposed a different decision-making structure to remedy the
Charter breach.
32
[2002] S.C.J. No. 3, [2002] 1 S.C.R. 3 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Suresh”].
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faced the possibility of torture.33 Suresh challenged the Minister’s
deportation order on both Charter and administrative law grounds.
A unanimous Court conducted both a Charter review of the enabling
provision and an administrative review of the Minister’s decision
pursuant to that provision, eventually determining that the process by
which Suresh was ordered deported violated his Charter rights.
With its decision in Multani v. Commission scolaire MargueriteBourgeoys,34 the Court made its first effort to develop a more
comprehensive approach to the dilemma of whether a Charter or
administrative law analysis should apply to administrative action.
Multani involved the discretionary decision of a school board to prohibit
a Sikh student from wearing his kirpan, a ceremonial dagger, to school.
The student and his family challenged the decision as an infringement of
his freedom of religion. The Supreme Court was unanimous in allowing
the challenge and striking down the Board’s decision but it split 6:2 on
whether a Charter or administrative law analysis should be applied in
reaching this result.
Madame Justice Charron for the majority adopted a Charter analysis
since the central issue in the case was whether or not the Board’s
decision complied with the requirements of the Charter.35 In contrast,
Deschamps and Abella JJ. for the minority argued that an administrative
law analysis should be conducted instead of a Charter analysis because
the instrument being assessed by the Court was an administrative
decision rather than a “norm of general application” such as “a law,
regulation, or other similar rule of general application”.36
The majority defined the role of administrative law solely in terms of
jurisdiction and warned against allowing the fundamental values
protected by the Charter to be dissolved into mere administrative law

33
Id., at para. 2. Section. 53(1)(b) of the Immigration Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. I-2, gave the
Minister limited discretion to deport where: the refugee’s “life or freedom would be threatened” if he
or she were returned to his or her country and the Minister’s belief that the refugee constituted a
“danger to the security of Canada”.
34
[2006] S.C.J. No. 6, 2006 SCC 6 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Multani”].
35
Id., at para. 2. The majority (Charron J., McLachlin C.J.C., Bastarache, Binnie and Fish JJ.)
held that the Board’s decision infringed the student’s freedom of religion under s. 2(a) of the Charter
and that the infringement could not be justified under s. 1. Justice LeBel wrote a separate opinion
agreeing with the majority that a Charter analysis was appropriate but proposing that the s. 1 analysis
be modified in cases involving administrative discretion, at paras. 140-155.
36
Id., at paras. 85, 103. The minority would have reviewed the Board’s decision on a
standard of reasonableness and would have concluded that the decision was unreasonable in
disregarding the student’s freedom of religion.
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principles.37 The majority position appears either to be unaware of or to
discount the significant substantive role of administrative law in
supervising the exercise of discretion and of public authority more
broadly. It is difficult to reconcile the thin and one-dimensional view of
administrative law in the majority judgment in Multani or Suresh with
the robust view of administrative law animating earlier Supreme Court
judgments such as Baker v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and
Immigration).38
The Court revisited this debate in Doré.39 In Doré, the Court
reviewed the decision of a provincial law society that imposed a
disciplinary penalty on a lawyer for inappropriate criticism of a judge.
The Court of Appeal approached Doré as a Charter case, much like
Slaight Communications, but the Supreme Court took a different
approach. Justice Abella, this time writing for the Court, adopted an
administrative law analysis to review the Quebec Barreau’s decision and
asserted that there is nothing in such an approach inconsistent with
strong Charter protections. This approach is set out in the following
terms:
The alternative is for the Court to embrace a richer conception of
administrative law, under which discretion is exercised “in light of
constitutional guarantees and the values they reflect” (Multani, at para.
152, per LeBel J.). Under this approach, it is unnecessary to retreat to a
s. 1 Oakes analysis in order to protect Charter values. Rather,
administrative decisions are always required to consider fundamental
values. ... These cases emphasize that administrative bodies are
empowered, and indeed required, to consider Charter values within
their scope of expertise. Integrating Charter values into the
administrative approach, and recognizing the expertise of these
decision-makers, opens “an institutional dialogue about the appropriate
use and control of discretion, rather than the older command-and40
control relationship” (Liston, at p. 100).

While the Court’s decision in Doré may have the potential to infuse
Charter values throughout administrative justice and to develop a more
“robust” approach to administrative law principles,41 it remains a skeletal

37
38
39
40
41

Id., at para. 16.
[1999] S.C.J. No. 39, [1999] 2 S.C.R. 817 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Baker”].
Supra, note 4.
Id., at para. 35.
Id., at para. 34.
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approach that needs to be fleshed out in the diverse contexts of
administrative justice. Doré itself represented a less-than-ideal context in
which to develop a Charter values approach, since the dispute was
litigated on the basis of a Charter right (freedom of expression), even if
expressive freedom may also be considered a value (a point elaborated
below).
The most important question that arises post-Doré might well be:
where do Charter values come from? At first glance, this question is so
straightforward as to be obvious. The source of Charter values must be
the Charter itself. But this clarity quickly gives way to murk. Does every
Charter right give rise to a corresponding value? Moreover, must values
derive only from one or more particular rights, or can they flow from
underlying Charter principles that are not set out in specific rights such
as human dignity? It is to this question that our analysis now turns.
1. Sources of Charter Values
According to Peter Hogg, the concept of “Charter values” existing
outside or beyond the interpretation of specific Charter rights can be
traced to the 1986 decision in R.W.D.S.U. v. Dolphin Delivery Ltd.,42
where the Supreme Court ruled that common law principles ought to be
consistent with the “fundamental values enshrined in the Constitution”.43
Dolphin Delivery, of course, considered the issue of principles lying
outside the application of the Charter (beyond the scope of section 32)
rather than values giving rise to a different kind of application of the
Charter.
The Court alluded to a concept of “Charter values” earlier that year in an
entirely different context, while defining what a “free and democratic
society” constitutes in R. v. Oakes.44 In Oakes, Dickson C.J.C. identified
values such as the “respect for the inherent dignity of the human person,
commitment to social justice and equality, accommodation for a wide
variety of beliefs, respect for cultural and group identity, and faith in
social and political institutions which enhance the participation of
individuals and groups in society” as the genesis of the rights and

[1986] S.C.J. No. 75, [1986] 2 S.C.R. 573 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Dolphin Delivery”].
Peter W. Hogg, “Equality as a Charter Value in Constitutional Interpretation” (2003)
20 S.C.L.R. (2d) 113, at 116 [hereinafter “Hogg”].
44
[1986] S.C.J. No. 7, [1986] 1 S.C.R. 103 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Oakes”].
42
43
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freedoms guaranteed by the Charter.45 Interestingly, Dickson C.J.C.
adopted the approach that Charter values underlie Charter rights as
opposed to the rights being the source for the values. Values in this
context, in other words, temper or limit rights. For this reason, not every
Charter value will accord with a specific Charter right and not every right
must give rise to a specific value.46
These references to Charter values were offered for the purpose of
explaining (or demarcating) Charter rights, rather than developing an
alternative framework for aligning administrative justice and the Charter.
That said, the Court has used Charter values to extend the scope of Charter
rights. For instance, in Health Services and Support – Facilities Subsector
Bargaining Assn. v. British Columbia, McLachlin C.J.C. used the values
identified in Oakes to give rise to a new protected right under section 2(d):
We conclude that the protection of collective bargaining under s. 2(d)
of the Charter is consistent with and supportive of the values
underlying the Charter and the purposes of the Charter as a whole.
Recognizing that workers have the right to bargain collectively as part
of their freedom to associate reaffirms the values of dignity, personal
47
autonomy, equality and democracy that are inherent in the Charter.

Chief Justice McLachlin reaffirmed the findings in Oakes by
highlighting that “[h]uman dignity, equality, liberty, respect for the
autonomy of the person, and the enhancement of democracy are among
the values that underlie the Charter”.48 Two years after Health Services,
the Court offered the following in Alberta v. Hutterian Brethren of
Wilson Colony:49
The deleterious effects of a limit on freedom of religion requires us to
consider the impact in terms of Charter values, such as liberty, human
dignity, equality, autonomy, and the enhancement of democracy:
Thomson Newspapers, at para. 125; see also Health Services and
Support — Facilities Subsector Bargaining Assn. v. British Columbia,

45

Id., at para. 64.
See, for example, Angela Cameron and Paul Daly, who argue that Dickson C.J.C.’s
approach to proportionality in Oakes constitutes a Charter value that must be considered by
administrative decision-makers, in “Furthering Substantive Equality through Administrative Law:
Charter Values in Education” [hereinafter “Cameron & Daly”]. On file with authors.
47
[2007] S.C.J. No. 27, 2007 SCC 27, at para. 86 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Health Services”].
48
As McLachlin C.J.C. notes, these values were also reaffirmed in R. v. Zundel, [1992] S.C.J.
No. 70, [1992] 2 S.C.R. 731 (S.C.C.) and Corbiere v. Canada (Minister of Indian and Northern
Affairs), [1999] S.C.J. No. 24, [1999] 2 S.C.R. 203 (S.C.C.). See Health Services, id., at para. 81.
49
[2009] S.C.J. No. 37, 2009 SCC 37 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Hutterian Brethren”].
46

(2014), 67 S.C.L.R. (2d)

CHARTER VALUES AND ADMINISTRATIVE JUSTICE

405

2007 SCC 27, [2007] 2 S.C.R. 391. The most fundamental of these
values, and the one relied on in this case, is liberty — the right of
50
choice on matters of religion.

Two tribunal cases underscore how Charter values and Charter rights
interact. In the pre-Health Services case Re Telus Communications Inc.,51
the Canadian Industrial Relations Board considered whether requiring
employees to join a bargaining unit in the absence of a representation vote
violated their freedom from compelled association. The Board relied on
the Federal Court of Appeal decision British Columbia Terminal Elevator
Operators’ Assn. v. International Longshore and Warehouse Union,
Canada52 to find that the right to be free from compelled association
constituted a Charter value stemming from section 2(d); however, the
tribunal did not cite a Charter value supporting the right to collective
bargaining. Arguably, it found quite the opposite: International Longshore
highlighted that the freedom to express one’s “opinion and commitment to
the principles of trade union solidarity by respecting the lawful picket lines
of others” did not constitute a Charter value.
However, in the post-Health Services decision Re Certain Employees
of Brandt Tractor Ltd. v. I.U.O.E., Local 115, the British Columbia
Labour Relations Board cited Health Services, and pursuant to the Doré
framework, balanced the established right of employees not to associate
under the Labour Relations Code with the value of collective bargaining
and the avoidance of industrial instability in the workplace.53
In this way, Charter values have migrated from the judicial context to
the context of administrative justice, but without serious or sufficient
discussion of the implications of this shift. The decision in Brandt
Tractor further demonstrates the symbiotic relationship between Charter
values and Charter rights but also reveals a lack of coherence in the
50

Id., at para. 88.
[2004] C.I.R.B.D. No. 19, 2004 CIRB 278 (C.I.R.B.), judicial review denied [2004]
F.C.J. No. 2123, 2004 FCA 438 (F.C.A.).
52
[2001] F.C.J. No. 459, 2001 FCA 78 (F.C.A.) [hereinafter “International Longshore”].
53
[2012] B.C.L.R.B.D. No. 192 (B.C.L.R.B.) [hereinafter “Brandt Tractor”]. Labour
Relations Code, R.S.B.C. 1996, c. 244. A similar view was endorsed by the Nova Scotia Court of
Appeal in Egg Films v. Nova Scotia (Labour Board), [2014] N.S.J. No. 150, 2014 NSCA 33
(N.S.C.A.) [hereinafter “Egg Films”]. The Court cited the Nova Scotia Labour Board’s interpretation
of Doré with approval: “The Board can only infer that the Supreme Court of Canada was strongly
reinforcing the notion that labour relations tribunals must be careful to ensure that in interpreting
their constitutive statutes, they engage in a purposive interpretational approach which is consonant
with the Charter values of freedom of association in Charter section 2(d)” (emphasis added). See
Egg Films, id., at para. 45.
51
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determination of whether a matter is better suited to Charter rights or a
Charter values approach.
One way forward may be to harken back to a pre-Doré approach —
such as that articulated by the Court in Baker.54 In Baker, the Court
decided that administrative decision-makers ought to use their discretion
“in accordance with the principles of the rule of law … in line with
general principles of administrative law governing the exercise of
discretion, and consistent with the Canadian Charter of Rights and
Freedoms”.55 The Court expanded on the need for decision-makers to
negotiate the rule of law, administrative law and Charter principles by
submitting that their “discretion must be exercised in accordance with the
boundaries imposed in the statute, the principles of the rule of law, the
principles of administrative law, the fundamental values of Canadian
society, and the principles of the Charter”.56 While Charter rights were
raised in Baker (and fully argued), the Court chose to resolve the
challenge on administrative law grounds with reference to the
importance of Charter values in circumscribing the exercise of
administrative discretion.
David Dyzenhaus has argued that Baker advanced the concept of the
“common law constitution”.57 He sees the rule of law as the fundamental
value that the Charter and the common law Constitution articulate but do
not exhaust.58 However, it is unclear whether Dyzenhaus suggests that
Charter values are subsumed within the wider principles of the rule of
law or the other way around. In a subsequent paragraph, he suggests that
decision-makers are subject to rule of law values, which are “considered
to be the fundamental or constitutional values of the society”.59 At the
end of the day, distinguishing Charter values from other aspects of the
“common law constitution” may result in distinctions with little
difference. The key principle for our purposes is that where an
adjudicative decision-maker is reviewing an exercise of discretion, the
first recourse of the adjudicator should be to Charter values. Arguably, a
matter should only proceed to a hearing based on a Charter right where a
Charter values framework is not able to resolve the challenge at issue.
54

Supra, note 38.
Id., at para. 53.
56
Id., at para. 56.
57
David Dyzenhaus, “Constituting the Rule of Law: Fundamental Values in Administrative
Law” (2002) 27 Queen’s L.J. 445, at 448 [hereinafter “Dyzenhaus”].
58
Id., at 498.
59
Id., at 499.
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(2014), 67 S.C.L.R. (2d)

CHARTER VALUES AND ADMINISTRATIVE JUSTICE

407

Courts and tribunals have used the passages in Baker referred to
above to limit the exercise of discretion when societal and constitutional
interests were at stake. For instance, the Ontario Court of Appeal in
Deloitte & Touche LLP v. Ontario (Securities Commission)60 and the
Ontario Securities Commission in Re Black61 invoked the passages in
Baker to rule that the Commission’s statutorily conferred discretion to
authorize disclosure in the public interest was restricted by the Charter.
The Ontario Securities Commission in Black relied on Charter values in
its analysis to determine the extent to which disclosure implicated the
public interest.62
The requirement to consider constitutional principles, however, has
also created inconsistencies in applying the Charter in administrative
realms. In Lalonde v. Ontario, consistent with the approach the Supreme
Court adopted in Baker, the Ontario Court of Appeal ruled that the
Health Restructuring Commission was obligated to consider the
constitutional principles of “respect for and protection of minorities” in
exercising its discretion to downscale health services.63 As the Court of
Appeal notes: “If the values of an international convention not adopted in
statute form by Parliament have a bearing on the validity of the exercise
of ministerial discretion, it must be the case that failure to take into
account a fundamental principle of the Constitution when purporting to
act in the public interest renders a discretionary decision subject to
judicial review.”64
The Ontario Superior Court in Tremblay v. Lakeshore (Town), by
contrast, held that a municipality was not obliged to consider the interests
of the French linguistic minority because “the case is to be determined on
traditional administrative law principles rather than constitutional
analysis”.65 While the issue here may simply be semantics (the difference
between a discretionary decision-maker being “obligated” to consider
constitutional principles as opposed to the failure to consider such
principles giving rise to a prima facie case of unreasonableness), the
outcome of a case may turn on such characterizations. Doré suggests that
60
[2002] O.J. No. 2350, 159 O.A.C. 257, at para. 29 (Ont. C.A.), affd [2003] S.C.J. No. 62,
[2003] 2 S.C.R. 713 (S.C.C.).
61
2007 LNONOSC 1055, 31 O.S.C.B. 10397 (O.S.C.) [hereinafter “Black”].
62
Id., at paras. 87-88.
63
[2001] O.J. No. 4767, 56 O.R. (3d) 577, at para. 173 (Ont. C.A.) [hereinafter “Lalonde”] .
64
Id., at para. 179.
65
Tremblay v. Lakeshore (Town), [2003] O.J. No. 4292, 179 O.A.C. 123, at para. 22
(Ont. S.C.J.).
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the importance of a bright line between administrative law and
constitutional principles may be diminishing.
Charter values within the Doré framework are rooted in
constitutional sources but take on significance within an administrative
law analysis. There remains ambiguity, however, as to the precise sources
of these Charter values within Canada’s Constitution. The significance of
these sources is clearly the Charter itself. In Doré, for example, it is
apparent that the source of the value of expressive freedom is the right to
freedom of expression in section 2 of the Charter. In other settings,
however, the relationship may be less linear. Privacy and human dignity
have been recognized as Charter values even though they do not arise
from a single Charter provision. More remote still, some Charter values
(such as respect for minority rights) may be tied to unwritten or
underlying constitutional principles or the “common law” Constitution.
Addressing the question of where Charter values come from and how
they are related to, but distinct from, Charter rights remains at an
embryonic stage. Peter Hogg has argued that every Charter right likely
has a corresponding Charter value, although this view has not been
adopted by the courts.66 As discussed above, David Dyzenhaus’s
discussion of Charter values in Baker adopts the premise that the Charter
simply has made more explicit the fundamental values that already
underlie Canada’s “common law constitution”.67 Charter values could
also flow from the preambular language reflecting commitments to the
rule of law and supremacy of God. We suggest that there may well be
multiple sources for Charter values — as the Charter both extended and
reflected Canada’s constitutional commitments.
While recognizing the importance of Charter values in Doré, the
Court did not explore or elaborate upon the source of those values or
their boundaries. They are simply assumed to exist and to form a
knowable conceptual framework to guide discretionary decisionmaking.68 Since the Court in Doré did not provide a definitive list of
values that are to inform administrative law decisions, previous
jurisprudence and tribunal decisions may be of assistance. It is to this
task that we now turn.

66
67
68

Hogg, supra, note 43, at 117.
Dyzenhaus, supra, note 57, at 453, 489.
Supra, note 4, at para. 6.
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2. The Scope of Charter Values
As Nicolas Lambert has observed, the main problem with attempting
to reconcile the various references to Charter values across disparate
cases is the lack of precise definition or explanation as to what is or is
not a Charter value and why.69 While any attempt to map the terrain of
Charter values must necessarily be a tentative enterprise in light of this
ambiguity, we argue that clarifying the scope of Charter values is
essential to ensuring their coherent and principled application in the
administrative justice context.
One approach to Charter values (in the sense the term was used in
the context of administrative justice in Doré) is that this refers to a
method of applying Charter rights. In other words, unlike the situation
where a Court (or tribunal) adjudicates a Charter challenge featuring the
adversarial presentation of evidence, the shifting onus of proof under
section 1 and an Oakes analysis, etc., a Charter values approach obviates
this formal methodology in favour of an administrative law balancing of
the Charter right at issue and the statutory objectives. On this view, the
scope of Charter values is simply the various rights set out in the section
of the Charter.70 In Doré, for example, the value at issue was expressive
freedom, and its scope is as set out in section 2(b) of the Charter.
A Charter values methodology could similarly be applied to the rights set
out in section 15, section 7, and so forth. This approach has the value of
clarity and transparency, but also appears to use a term, “Charter values”,
that has been deployed to convey something different than simply the
text of the Charter rights themselves. When the Court refers to the
importance of Charter values in interpreting and developing the common
law, for example, the Court has indicated that such values include
“human dignity” and the “values enshrined in the Charter”.71
The courts have recognized a number of Charter values in common
law and constitutional settings. Will all these values be applicable to the
context of administrative justice? While it is premature to attempt to map

69
Correspondence with one of the authors and Professor Lambert, January 24, 2013, on file
with authors. See also N. Lambert, “The Charter in the Administrative Process: Statutory Remedy or
Refounding of Administrative Jurisdiction?” (2007) 13 Rev. Const. Stud. 21.
70
We are grateful to discussions with David Wright for fleshing out this approach to the
scope of Charter values.
71
R. v. Salituro, [1991] S.C.J. No. 97, [1991] 3 S.C.R. 654, at para. 49 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter
“Salituro”].
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the entire terrain of Charter values in the context of administrative
justice, those Charter values already recognized by the courts likely will
serve as a point of departure. More importantly, the methodology
employed by the courts in developing Charter values in judicial settings
may shed light on how the scope of such values may be applied by
administrative decision-makers.
Below, we set out a non-exhaustive list of the Charter values which
have been variously mentioned or elaborated by the courts, some of
which parallel specific Charter rights, and some of which go beyond the
specific text of the Charter.
(a) Liberty
As the Chief Justice asserted in the Hutterian Brethren decision,
“liberty” is perhaps the most significant Charter value. Liberty has been
discussed as a Charter value in at least two senses. First, in the positive
sense, liberty has been framed as an expression of individual choice.
Second, liberty has been used in the negative sense, as freedom from
interference by the state. Justice Bertha Wilson addressed “liberty in the
context” of the values underlying the Charter in her concurring reasons
in Morgentaler:
The idea of human dignity finds expression in almost every right
and freedom guaranteed in the Charter. Individuals are afforded the
right to choose their own religion and their own philosophy of life,
the right to choose with whom they will associate and how they will
express themselves, the right to choose where they will live and
what occupation they will pursue. These are all examples of the
basic theory underlying the Charter, namely that the state will
respect choices made by individuals and, to the greatest extent
possible, will avoid subordinating these choices to any one
conception of the good life.
Thus, an aspect of the respect for human dignity on which the Charter
is founded is the right to make fundamental personal decisions without
interference from the state. This right is a critical component of the
right to liberty. Liberty, as was noted in Singh, is a phrase capable of a
broad range of meaning. In my view, this right, properly construed,
grants the individual a degree of autonomy in making decisions of
fundamental personal importance. …
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Liberty in a free and democratic society does not require the state to
approve the personal decisions made by its citizens; it does, however,
72
require the state to respect them.

While Wilson J.’s view of liberty did not attract majority support in
Morgentaler, similar formulations have been adopted by the Court in
discussing the value of liberty in subsequent cases, particularly as part of
the section 1 justification analysis.
In Hutterian Brethren, the Court considered whether a religious
community’s freedom of religion was infringed by a requirement that
photos accompany an application for a driver’s licence.73 The Chief
Justice, as noted above, recognized that in determining whether an
infringement is justified, the Court should consider not just Charter rights
but the values underlying those rights, of which the most important is
“liberty”. Because the incidental effect of the photo requirement for
driver’s licences was not to preclude religious practice but rather to
impose a cost on religious practice (where transportation options other
than driving would have to be pursued), it constituted a reasonable limit.
Had the incidental impact been to preclude the practice of a religious
ritual or sacrament, as the ban on kirpans in schools at issue in Multani
implicated, the Court would presumably have come to the opposite
conclusion based on the liberty value.
While the Court’s recourse to values such as liberty as part of the
section 1 analysis has been incorporated into the Oakes framework of
analysis, it remains to be worked out how such values will inform the
balancing envisioned in Doré. At a minimum, the Court’s examination of
the Charter value of liberty suggests that these values will be treated as a
spectrum rather than an absolute point or bright line for purposes of such
balancing. This is particularly relevant for administrative justice, where
nearly every statutory tribunal or regulatory agency includes within its
mandate the adjudication of state interference in the freedom of people to
pursue their own choices.

72

Supra, note 19, at 166-67. This passage was cited with approval by Iacobucci J. in
Salituro, supra, note 71, in elaborating the application of Charter values to the development of the
common law.
73
Supra, note 49.
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(b) Human Dignity
The value of human dignity is invoked often in Charter jurisprudence
but rarely explored.74 As noted above in Wilson J.’s reasons in
Morgentaler, it is described as a value informing nearly all Charter
rights. Additionally, it is referred to as a Charter value in Hill v. Church
of Scientology.75 While examining the value of freedom of expression,
discussed below, Cory J. submits that “the good reputation of the
individual represents and reflects the innate dignity of the individual, a
concept which underlies all the Charter rights”.76 That said, Cory J. was
also careful to emphasize that the application of Charter values such as
human dignity to common law rules is not the same as expanding the
application of the Charter itself to all private action, and in so doing
attempted the distinguish Charter rights from Charter values. Justice
Cory explained:
The most that the private litigant can do is argue that the common law
is inconsistent with Charter values. It is very important to draw this
distinction between Charter rights and Charter values. Care must be
taken not to expand the application of the Charter beyond that
established by s. 32(1), either by creating new causes of action, or by
subjecting all court orders to Charter scrutiny. Therefore, in the context
of civil litigation involving only private parties, the Charter will
“apply” to the common law only to the extent that the common law is
77
found to be inconsistent with Charter values.

We believe a similar approach underlies Doré. Human dignity has
arisen not just in the expressive context but in a variety of other Charter
settings. Where an exercise of discretion appears to undermine this value,
should this be included within the scope of Charter values which an
administrative decision-maker ought to consider? Pearl Eliadis, for
example, has argued that cases concerning poverty law should be
informed by the “Charter-inspired value” of human dignity.78
If human dignity is within the scope of Charter values, then Charter
values may become over-broad, inchoate and difficult to apply
74
For discussion, see L. Sossin, “The ‘Supremacy of God’, Human Dignity and the Charter
of Rights and Freedoms” (2003) 52 U.N.B.L.J. 227 [hereinafter “Sossin”].
75
[1995] S.C.J. No. 64, [1995] 2 S.C.R. 1130 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Hill”]. See also WIC
Radio Ltd. v. Simpson, [2008] S.C.J. No. 41, 2008 SCC 40, at para. 79 (S.C.C.).
76
Id., at para. 120.
77
Id., at para. 95.
78
For further discussion, see Sossin, supra, note 74.
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coherently. If human dignity lies outside the scope of Charter values,
however, then a two-tier approach to the Charter may develop, with
courts pursuing a broad approach to the term while administrative
adjudicators would be limited to a narrow approach. Given that what is at
issue in the application of Charter values in administrative justice is an
administrative law balancing, not a specific invalidation of any
government action, then we would suggest the broader approach is more
appropriate. Subject to judicial review on reasonableness grounds as
envisioned in Doré, it should be for administrative decision-makers and
adjudicators to determine the range of Charter values which have
application in the framework of their specialized context. Yet the openended and uncharted nature of such a value raises important concerns.
How will parties and their advocates anticipate the ways in which a value
as diffuse as “human dignity” might factor into the decision-making
process? In a social benefits context, will it mean something similar to
what it means in a prison or hospital context? Operationalizing values
such as human dignity poses far more challenging dilemmas than
recognizing those values, as we explore further in the final section of this
study.
(c) Equality
Equality is a value that has underpinned decisions dealing with a
variety of Charter rights, and also is set out as a specific guarantee in
section 15 of the Charter. The extensive reference to the equality value
lends support to Angela Cameron and Paul Daly’s view that it constitutes
a fundamental principle of the Constitution, akin to those unwritten
constitutional principles elaborated in the Secession Reference.79 In other
words, the Charter value of equality goes well beyond the specific
elaboration of the equality right under section 15. For example, Peter
Hogg outlines several cases concerning freedom of association, the right
to vote and principles of fundamental justice that are premised on the
value of equality.80
The equality value has been used in common law settings as well. In
MacCabe v. Westlock Roman Catholic Separate School District No. 110,81
79

Cameron & Daly, supra, note 46, at 19; see Reference re Secession of Quebec, [1998]
S.C.J. No. 61, [1998] 2 S.C.R. 217 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Secession Reference”].
80
Hogg, supra, note 43, at 121, 122, 126-30.
81
[2001] A.J. No. 1278, 2001 ABCA 257 (Alta. C.A.) [hereinafter “MacCabe”].
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for example, the Alberta Court of Appeal ruled that the common law
guiding tort remedies should try to be consistent with Charter values,
which includes “equality”. Equality also has been referenced in
administrative justice settings. In Ismail v. British Columbia (Human
Rights Tribunal),82 for example, the British Columbia Superior Court
employed a Doré analysis to balance the values of equality and free
expression.
(d) Autonomy
Personal autonomy is a Charter value that has been used as an
interpretive guide in common law settings.83 Here again, while captured
in specific rights such as the right to be free from unreasonable search
and seizure in section 8 of the Charter, autonomy extends beyond this
and any other specific Charter right as well. For example, the Supreme
Court in Salituro suggested that the common law rule invalidating the
competence of a spousal witness in the context where the spouses are
irreconcilably separated was inconsistent with Charter values,
specifically that “individual choices [should] not be restricted
unnecessarily”.84
Justice Iacobucci, writing for the Court, explained the relevance of
Charter values as follows:
Where the principles underlying a common law rule are out of step
with the values enshrined in the Charter, the courts should scrutinize
the rule closely. If it is possible to change the common law rule so as to
make it consistent with Charter values, without upsetting the proper
balance between judicial and legislative action that I have referred to
above, then the rule ought to be changed. The common law rule making
an irreconcilably separated spouse an incompetent witness for the
prosecution against the other spouse is inconsistent with the values in
the Charter. Subject to consideration of the limits on the judicial role,
the rule ought therefore to be changed. Society can have no interest in
preserving marital harmony where spouses are irreconcilably separated
85
because there is no marital harmony to be preserved.
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[2013] B.C.J. No. 1308, 2013 BCSC 1079 (B.C.S.C.).
MacCabe, supra, note 81, at paras. 106-107 (Alta. C.A.).
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Mayo Moran has used Salituro to explain the importance of Charter
values as a guide to the interpretation and application of the common
law. For example, in addition to Iacobucci J.’s concerns over autonomy,
the common law rule was premised on an anachronistic view of women
and an exaggerated emphasis placed on the promotion of marital
harmony.86 In this respect, the common law rule clashed with the equality
values enshrined in the Charter.87 Moran uses this example to stress the
need to look beyond specific guarantees in the Charter when interpreting
the common law, in favour of a reading that is in accordance with the
“basic underlying theory of the Charter”.88 From this standpoint,
autonomy and equality values speak to the broader, more fundamental
values of the Charter; it is against these underlying values that the
common law develops.89
This connection is not unique to autonomy and equality. Indeed, many
Charter values (just like Charter rights) should be seen as mutually
reinforcing and interlocking. This adds to the coherence of Charter values
in administrative justice, but also to their complexity and variability.
(e) Fairness
In addition to the Charter values expressed above, numerous courts
and commentators have noted values stemming from common law rules
concerning process. The Charter value of fairness is particularly
applicable to the sphere of administrative justice, where procedural
fairness has universal relevance.
Robert Currie notes that the Charter values of procedural fairness and
a fair trial, embodied within sections 7 and 11(d), inform the common law
rules of evidence.90 Currie goes on to demonstrate that other common law
rules of defence, such as confession rules and the ability to make a full
answer and defence, have been “constitutionalized” through their
intersection with “Charter standards”.91 Kent Roach expands upon this
point by demonstrating that the common law rules relating to admissibility
86
Mayo Moran, “Authority, Influence, and Persuasion: Baker, Charter values and the
Puzzle of Method” in David Dyzenhaus, ed., The Unity of Public Law (Toronto: Hart, 2004), at 417.
87
Id., at 418.
88
Id.
89
Id.
90
Robert J. Currie, “The Evolution of the Law of Evidence: Plus Ça change ...?” (2011) 15
Can. Crim. L. Rev. 213, at 222.
91
Id.
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of evidence were modified in R. v. Seaboyer; R. v. Gayme92 in order to be
consistent with Charter values.93 He notes that other common law
presumptions such as fairness and respect for international commitments
to human rights reflect Charter values, whereas common law presumptions
such as the right to property have lost their resonance in the Charter era.94
The decisions in Hennessy v. Horse Racing Alberta95 and Gonzalez v.
Alberta (Driver Control Board)96 affirm Roach and Currie’s findings that
procedural fairness and common law rules of evidence arguably are
informed by Charter values as well.97 In Hennessy, the Queen’s Bench
reviewed an appeal from the Tribunal of Horse Racing Alberta. The
Court found that the claimant was denied procedural fairness and
fundamental justice because he was unable to make a full answer and
defence, which the Court considered a Charter value.98
Finally, the Quebec Court of Appeal recently described “natural
justice” as a Charter value emanating from section 7 of the Charter. In
Syndicat des travailleuses et travailleurs de ADF - CSN v. Syndicat des
employés de Au Dragon Forgé Inc, the Quebec Court of Appeal applied
Doré to balance the objective of a law that sought to maintain
confidentiality in disciplinary boards with the value of natural justice.99
(f) Expressive Freedom
The Supreme Court has identified “freedom of expression” as a
Charter value. In its decisions concerning defamation,100 journalistsourced privilege101 and picketing,102 the Court has used the Charter value
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of freedom of expression in order to rule on the validity of the common
law in the Charter era. The use of the value was most recently applied by
the Ontario Court of Appeal. In Jones v. Tsige, the Court of Appeal
balanced the right to privacy with the Charter value of freedom of
expression.103
Expressive freedom has also been applied in the context of
administrative justice. In Goldberg v. Law Society (British Columbia),
the British Columbia Court of Appeal discussed whether the Charter
value of “freedom of expression” was engaged in a disciplinary hearing
case. The Court highlighted the Charter value of freedom of expression,
opposed to the Charter right of section 2(b), because “we [the court] do
not have a Charter issue squarely before us”.104 Freedom of expression as
a Charter value was confirmed in Pridgen v. University of Calgary,
where the Court rejected the findings of the Review Committee and
Board of Governors on the basis that it made no attempt to balance the
statutory mandate with the right of freedom of expression.105 While the
Court discussed freedom of expression in light of Charter rights and
statute, its discussion of Charter values and application of Doré support
the contention that freedom of expression constitutes a Charter value.
The value was more clearly applied in the 2014 case Wilson v.
University of Calgary.106 In Wilson, a student anti-abortion group held
on-campus protests displaying graphic imagery. The university
administrators, pursuant to their authority under the Post-secondary
Learning Act,107 requested that the images be turned away from public
viewing. In evaluating the administrators’ decision, the Alberta Court of
Queen’s Bench balanced the Charter value of “free expression” with the
statutory objective of promoting campus safety.
Expressive freedom as a Charter value has also been identified at the
tribunal level. In Taylor-Baptiste v. Ontario Public Service Employees
Union108 and Marceau v. Brock University,109 the Ontario Human Rights
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Tribunal used reference to the Charter value of expressive freedom as a
tool in interpreting the Human Rights Code.110
Most significantly, of course, expressive freedom was at issue in the
Doré decision itself. Justice Abella recognized that “in dealing with the
appropriate boundaries of civility, the severity of the conduct must be
interpreted in light of the expressive rights guaranteed by the Charter,
and, in particular, the public benefit in ensuring the right of lawyers to
express themselves about the justice system in general and judges in
particular”.111 The Court concluded that in light of the egregious content
and tone of the lawyer’s complaint about the judge, the Court’s balancing
of expressive freedom with the statutory objectives of the Barreau’s Code
of Ethics “cannot be said to represent an unreasonable balance”.112
(g) Religious Freedom
Freedom of religion was recently identified as a Charter value within
the Aboriginal context. In Ktunaxa Nation v. British Columbia, the
Minister of Forests, Lands and Natural Resource Operations approved
the development of a ski resort on Crown land.113 The land was sacred to
the Ktunaxa people and was central to their spirituality. According to the
petitioners, the proposed site would denigrate the area. In addition to
their arguments under section 35 of the Constitution Act, 1982,114 the
Ktunaxa alleged that the Minister’s decision infringed their section 2(a)
Charter rights because it violated their spiritual practices and beliefs.115
In assessing the petitioners’ arguments under section 2(a) of the
Charter, the British Columbia Superior Court applied Doré to determine
whether the decision-maker balanced the Charter value at stake —
freedom of religion — with the statutory objectives of encouraging
outdoor recreation and disposing Crown lands in the public interest,
pursuant to the Ministry of Lands, Parks and Housing Act and Land
Act,116 respectively. When balancing Charter values with these
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objectives, the Court noted that the Minister must “consider all relevant
social, economic, and environmental factors”.117
The Court found that the Minister’s decision was a reasonable
balancing of the Charter value of freedom of religion with the applicable
statutory objectives. While the Minister did not directly address the
Charter issue when making the decision, the Court recognized that the
Minister “sincerely recognise[d] the genuinely sacred values at stake for
the Ktunaxa leadership”.118 Furthermore, the Minister made several
changes to the proposal in order to accommodate Aboriginal concerns.
These accommodations could support the reasonableness of the decision:
[A]ny accommodation measure that addresses the substance of the
asserted right in this case can be considered both in determining
whether the duty to consult was met and in assessing whether the
balancing of Charter values was proportionate. In saying this, I do not
find the balancing of s. 2(a) to necessarily have the same procedural or
substantive requirements as the duty to consult and accommodate in
relation to an asserted aboriginal spiritual right. …
… Though stated as in relation to the Ktunaxa’s asserted aboriginal
spiritual right under s. 35, the same measures [accommodations] are
germane to assessing whether the Minister’s decision represents a
proportionate balancing of s. 2(a) with the applicable statutory
119
objectives.

Applying accommodations made pursuant to section 35 to discern
the reasonableness of an administrative decision is unique to cases that
require both Aboriginal and administrative law analyses. Nevertheless,
the central role that religious freedom played in determining the
reasonableness of the Minister’s decision suggests the solidification of
“religious freedom” as a Charter value.
(h) Privacy
Privacy represents yet another Charter value which is likely to find
application in administrative justice contexts and which exists outside of
the context of a specific Charter right. In M. (A.) v. Ryan,120 the Supreme
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Court has employed Charter values to extend the scope of common law
privilege to reflect changing “social and legal realities of our time”, and
in particular the privacy of victims of sexual violence who seek
psychiatric counselling.121
In Gore v. College of Physicians and Surgeons (Ontario),122 for
example, the appellant physicians disputed an investigation by the
Registrar of the College of Physicians and Surgeons pursuant to
the Regulated Health Professions Act, 1991.123 The appellants argued that
the regulation (and presumably, decisions made pursuant to the
regulation) should be interpreted in light of the Charter values of
protection of patient privacy and protection against self-incrimination.
The Court ultimately chose not to invoke Charter values in deciding the
case since the regulation was not ambiguous and a Charter values
approach was thus unnecessary.124 However, the Court neither confirmed
nor disputed the existence of the Charter values raised.
3. Conclusion
The list above is not exhaustive, and should be seen as a dynamic
rather than static aspect of the Charter’s application to administrative
justice. We recognize that the scope of Charter values set out above is a
somewhat subjective account of an ill-defined category. Other possible
Charter values could be added, including, for example, mobility,
mentioned in the context of Khadr v. Canada (Attorney General).125 In
that case, the Federal Court reviewed the government’s decision to refuse
Omar Khadr’s request for a passport. The Federal Court ruled that the
“right to leave Canada is a sufficiently important aspect of an
individual’s freedom” and constituted a Charter value.126 The Court also
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argued that the issuance of a passport reflects the Charter value expressed
by mobility rights.127 We viewed this value as simply overlapping the
mobility right as opposed to a distinct value that could constrain
discretion or guide statutory interpretation.
Similarly, the Supreme Court in Multani highlighted the promotion
of multiculturalism and diversity as consistent with the Charter although
it did not characterize them as Charter values per se.128 Even if not
elevated to the status of a Charter value, in Lalonde, as noted above, the
Ontario Court of Appeal held that respect for and protection of minorities
constituted an unwritten constitutional principle.129 Similarly, democracy
was recognized as an unwritten constitutional principle in the Secession
Reference,130 and invoked as a Charter value in Hutterian Brethren, as set
out above. While mobility is arguably too narrow to constitute a Charter
value, multiculturalism and the enhancement of democracy may be
overly broad to fulfil this function. Alternatively, it may be that values
such as mobility and multiculturalism are still inchoate and through
further refinement and development may be recognized as within the
scope of Charter values delineated above.
Notwithstanding its tentative nature, we believe the scope of Charter
values discussed above in Charter jurisprudence represents an important
point of departure for the development of Charter values for
administrative justice. While Charter values may be seen as limited
simply to the text of Charter rights differently applied in administrative
justice settings, this does not appear to be how the courts themselves
have conceived of Charter values, nor would such a formalist approach
be in keeping with the robust and adaptive administrative law framework
invoked in Doré. That said, many of the values set out lack an important
contextual dimension.
Administrative justice, unlike courts, must also take into
consideration the policy mandate of a particular decision-making body
127
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and the purposive nature of statutory or prerogative authority. As the
Supreme Court recognized in the context of Charter remedies in Conway,
while a court may do anything that is “just and appropriate” pursuant to
section 24(1) remedies, a tribunal could only remedy Charter breaches by
recourse to their statutorily mandated powers.131 The Charter cannot, in
other words, be used by a tribunal to frustrate or usurp the role of the
legislature in demarcating the boundaries of that tribunal’s authority or
its reasons for being. A similar conceptual framework, we suggest,
applies in the context of Charter values. While the Charter jurisprudence
can shed light on the scope of Charter values, it remains for each tribunal
to determine which Charter values will be relevant to its mandate, and
how to balance those values against its policy mandate. For example,
while personal autonomy may be a broadly recognized Charter value, it
will necessarily mean something different in the context of a privacy
commission than in the context of a parole board. The variability in the
application of Charter values mirrors the variability of other
administrative law frameworks (for example, procedural justice) as
discussed further below. In other words, in the administrative justice
sphere, variability may be part of the solution, not the problem.
While statutory and policy context are distinctly important for any
analysis of the scope of Charter values in an administrative justice
context, the Charter must continue to be a mechanism for advancing
broader rights than those contained in a particular statutory or policy
context. Charter values, in this sense, provide a bridge between
fundamental and core values on the one hand, and the choices
legislatures and executive government make on the other. Determining
the scope of Charter values requires being attentive to both these
dynamics in the diverse contexts of administrative justice. Further, the
dilemmas accompanying the power of unelected judges to further policy
aims and constrain democratic action through judicial review does not
apply in the context of administrative justice.132 Here, the Charter cannot
negate or “trump” legislative choices, but rather can be used to inform,
refine, focus and interpret those choices.
In light of the analysis above, our discussion turns to how
administrative decision-makers (and the courts that review those
131
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decisions) may operationalize Charter values in a fashion that is
coherent, transparent, consistent, workable, and principled.

III. OPERATIONALIZING CHARTER VALUES
After Doré, the Supreme Court confirmed that tribunals have the
opportunity to imbue their decisions regarding the exercise of
administrative discretion with Charter values and engage in a more active
form of constitutional interpretation. At the same time, Charter values
remain an important tool of statutory interpretation where competing
approaches to a statutory power are available. In still other cases, Charter
values may inform how common law rules are interpreted and applied.
Charter values in each of these contexts will be relevant to administrative
justice. How can the consistency and coherence of these interpretations
of Charter values be assured? In short, how can Charter values be
developed through administrative justice decision-making? Is it open to
tribunals to identify new Charter values or extend existing ones? In this
section, we examine how administrative justice decision-makers have
approached the task of delineating and operationalizing Charter values.
In Black, the Ontario Securities Commission considered whether the
right against self-incrimination and the right to make a full answer and
defence constituted Charter values.133 The Commission attempted to
balance these competing values by considering their merits and how the
privileging of one would compromise the other. However, the
Commission did not offer a definitive test to help us reconcile these
values in the end.134
Since Doré, tribunals have yet to achieve greater methodological
clarity. For example, in C. (R.) v. District School Board of Niagara, the
Human Rights Tribunal of Ontario granted the Canadian Civil Liberties
Association intervener status for the purposes of discussing “how values
of the [Charter] including s. 2(a) (freedom of religion) and s. 15
(‘equality’) should inform the interpretation of the Code” in question.135
While one can surmise that both “equality” and “freedom of religion”
were Charter values for the purposes of C. (R.), the case did not
crystallize a method for testing the existence of these values in future
133
134
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cases. In Brandt Tractor,136 mentioned above, the British Columbia
Labour Relations Board applied Doré in considering employees’
applications for partial decertification from their union under the Labour
Relations Code.
Operationalizing Charter values should be seen as part of a model of
administrative justice referred to as “active adjudication”.137 This form of
more flexible adjudication may be particularly important in contexts
where one or more parties often will have no legal representation and
where adjudicators often will not have legal training. Tribunals are less
constrained by an adversarial model of adjudication, and have developed
methods to accommodate the challenges that vulnerable parties coming
before the tribunal may experience. In the context of Charter values, this
more effective and efficient model may involve the adjudicators
identifying rights issues where the parties do not have the background or
capacity to do so and taking steps to obtain the information or
submissions necessary to adjudicate them. This may involve mechanisms
that range from retaining amicus counsel to engaging in inquisitorial
questioning, or developing interpretive guidelines upon which parties
and decision-makers can rely.138
The methodology by which administrative decision-makers might
integrate Charter values dates back to Slaight Communications and is
fairly straightforward.139 So, for example, where two interpretations are
open to a tribunal member and one will advance a Charter value more
than the other, it should be preferred. When a statute’s meaning remains
ambiguous, Charter values may be employed to inform the statutory
language.140 Given the diversity of settings and variety of Charter values
elaborated above, however, a more textured methodology may be
136
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required to give effect to the application of Charter values to
administrative discretion in Doré. We suggest the following approach as
an example of such a methodology.
1. Discretionary Authority or Interpretive Scope
First, the administrative decision-maker needs to identify a
discretionary power, or a question of interpretation for which more than
one approach would be plausible. As the courts have made clear in
developing Charter values, this situation arises only where a decisionmaker is exercising discretion. This is an important constraint on
administrative decision-makers applying the Doré framework. Charter
values cannot be used either to invalidate a statutory provision or to
render it inoperative in the sense available to such decision-makers if a
legislative provision is impugned under the Charter per se. Only the
application of the Charter itself can trigger such a remedy, and in such
circumstances, additional procedural steps (e.g., issuing a notice of
constitutional question) and substantive steps (e.g., the application of
the Oakes test) are triggered. Thus, the first logical step in the application
of Charter values is to identify the nature and scope of the discretion
at issue.
While it is beyond the scope of this paper to elaborate on what
constitutes a “discretion”, suffice it to say that it may only arise where
the wording or context of legislation makes clear that its application
depends on the judgment of the person authorized to apply it, and where
there is more than one possible option available to that authorized
person.141
2. Identification of Potential Charter Value
Second, the administrative decision-maker must conclude that the
identified discretion engages a recognized Charter value (or, potentially,
a novel value analogous to an existing Charter value). Administrative
decision-makers cannot be expected to be intuitively aware of the range
of Charter values; rather, tribunals should develop training and, ideally,
guidelines, which highlight the Charter values most relevant to the
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subject matter of the tribunal.142 For example, equality and expressive
freedom might play a significant role in an education tribunal while
privacy, autonomy and fairness might play a more significant role in a
social benefits tribunal.
While administrative decision-makers should be open to and
consider submissions from the parties on Charter values, it is important
to emphasize that fulfilling the goals of Charter values may require
“active adjudication” on the part of decision-makers. Active adjudication
in this context may involve a decision-maker raising a Charter value on
her own (even if it is not raised by the parties).
3. Balancing from Doré of the Value against the Statutory
Objectives as Set Out in Doré
Third, as set out by the Supreme Court in Doré, the next stage of the
methodology would be the balancing exercise where the value of the
Charter value is weighed against the objectives of the discretionary
authority:
How then does an administrative decision-maker apply Charter values
in the exercise of statutory discretion? He or she balances the Charter
values with the statutory objectives. In effecting this balancing, the
decision-maker should first consider the statutory objectives. In Lake,
for instance, the importance of Canada’s international obligations, its
relationships with foreign governments, and the investigation,
prosecution and suppression of international crime justified the prima
facie infringement of mobility rights under s. 6(1) (para. 27). In Pinet,
the “twin goals of public safety and fair treatment” grounded the
assessment of whether an infringement of an individual’s liberty
interest was justified (para. 19).
Then the decision-maker should ask how the Charter value at issue will
best be protected in view of the statutory objectives. This is at the core
of the proportionality exercise, and requires the decision-maker to

142
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balance the severity of the interference of the Charter protection with
143
the statutory objectives.

While the Court has been explicit in stating this is not simply a
different venue for the application of the Oakes approach, it is likely that
administrative decision-makers will search for an analogous proportionality
framework in order to provide some degree of transparency and rigour in
this balancing process. Tellingly, the early applications of Doré have not
yielded innovative templates for this balancing.
One balancing template consistent with Abella J.’s invocation of
enriching the administrative law approach would be to adapt the
framework developed by the Supreme Court in Baker (and applied to
Charter settings in Suresh) in order to determine the degree of fairness
appropriate to particular settings. In other words, when considering how
to reconcile statutory objectives with Charter values, the administrative
decision-maker should look to the nature and purpose of the statute, the
nature of the discretion at issue, the importance of the decision to
affected parties, the legitimate expectations of those affected and any
specialized procedures — such as applicable guidelines — which may
guide the decision-maker. While the proportionality exercise in fairness
determinations is of a different kind than that contemplated in Doré, the
contextual nature of such determinations seems well suited to working
through how Charter values should inform constrains on the exercise of
discretion.
For example, where the Charter values amplify the statutory
objectives, or where such values are of particular importance for affected
vulnerable parties, those Charter values might be given more weight. I
would suggest this framework captures the approach Abella J. adopted in
Doré. She acknowledged the importance of expressive freedom and the
scope for a lawyer to criticize a judge. She then considered the nature of
the statute in question and the importance of the Code of Ethics in
promoting public confidence in the administration of justice and civility
among lawyers. Further, she considered the nature of the disciplinary
committee’s discretion, which is expansive. She noted the impact on
Doré himself, highlighting that only a reprimand was at stake. Finally,
she acknowledged the Committee’s deliberative process in determining
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that Doré’s conduct “overstepped” generally accepted norms of
“moderation and dignity”.144
We would suggest that such an approach has the added advantage of
being familiar and accepted as a legitimate framework among
administrative decision-makers, judges and administrative law advocates
alike, and where a rich and textured body of jurisprudence and
commentary already exists on which to build.
Whatever approach is adopted by a decision-maker, it will be a
challenge for parties and advocates to predict at the outset how Charter
values might affect their positions in an administrative adjudication. As
with the development of procedural fairness within administrative
justice, clarity will follow experience, as different administrative
decision-makers sort out the proper application of the Doré framework in
their statutory context. The courts will have a role to play here as well,
both to establish some key parameters and through appropriate
deference, to recognize and validate the necessary space for
administrative decision-makers to develop an approach to the Charter
commensurate with their perspective, expertise and experience.
The proper balancing of Charter values and the objectives of the
statute will also depend on the adoption by administrative decisionmakers of “active adjudication” strategies. In this sense, while decisionmakers may benefit from the submission of parties, they cannot depend
solely on such submissions in settings where most parties are
unrepresented and cannot be expected on their own to identify and argue
Charter values. Further, the importance of active adjudication to the
effectiveness of the Doré framework once again demonstrates the
importance of tribunal training and resources such as guidelines on
tribunal-specific Charter values.
4. Explanation of Process and Results of Balancing in Clear Reasons
Having engaged in the balancing exercise outlined above, the fourth
stage of the Charter values methodology involves setting out a clear
explanation for the conclusion reached above. The importance of reasons
in this context cannot be overstated. Because of the inherently subjective
aspect of the balancing exercise envisioned in Doré, reasons play a dual
role. First, reasons will contribute to the credibility and legitimacy of the
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development of Charter values rooted in the realities of administrative
justice. Second, reasons perform an accountability function, confirming
both the soundness of the rationale underlying a decision-maker’s
decision, and assuring a greater degree of consistency and oversight.
The methodology set out above can be adapted to the diverse range
of administrative decision-making contexts. Over time, if followed, this
methodology would generate a body of training materials, guidelines and
reasons on Charter values which, if paired with thoughtful and
considered judicial commentary on judicial reviews of such decisions,
could result in a constructive and principled framework for the
application of discretionary authority in the era of the Charter.
While it is beyond the scope of this paper to explore in detail the
deference contemplated by the Supreme Court in Doré applicable to
decisions by administrative adjudicators as to Charter values, it follows
that the rationale for such deference is the distinctive and different lens
on the Charter’s application to administrative justice that such
adjudicators use.145 It is important, through reasons, to see how this lens
will come to view the Charter in distinctive terms. Moreover, the
standard of reasonableness to be applied to such determinations will
depend on reasons in order to ensure meaningful oversight of
administrative decision-makers by the courts.146

IV. CONCLUSION
In this exploratory analysis, we have sought to advance the view of a
sphere of Charter justice that is distinctly suited to administrative justice.
We have discussed the ways in which the Charter and administrative law
doctrines have been reconciled in the jurisprudence leading up to Doré.
We have canvassed the sources of Charter values, and offered a tentative
summary of the scope of Charter values to this point in time. Finally, we
have discussed how a framework of Charter values could be
operationalized with the diverse contexts of administrative justice.
In a sense, the Doré framework opens up the possibility of a new and
different kind of Charter dialogue, between administrative decision-makers
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and courts, in which expertise in policy-specific decision-making
contexts may inform the development of Charter values and vice versa.
Our focus has been both on the conceptual coherence of Charter
values and on how the Charter can be adapted to the distinct realities of
administrative justice. In developing an approach to the Charter rooted
not in courts and the formal determination of rights, but in the realm of
discretionary decision-making and the oversight of such decisions, we
believe the promise of the Charter to protect those affected by the
exercise of public authority can at last be meaningfully fulfilled.

